Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Hypervelocity Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress

Three potential new weapons could improve the ability of Navy surface ships to defend themselves against enemy missiles — solid state lasers (SSLs), the electromagnetic railgun (EMRG), and the hypervelocity projectile (HVP).

Laser Weapon System (LaWS) on USS Ponce (Source: U.S. Navy)

Although Navy surface ships have a number of means for defending themselves against anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), some observers are concerned about the survivability of Navy surface ships in potential combat situations against adversaries, such as China, that are armed with advanced ASCMs and ASBMs. Concern about this issue has led some observers to conclude that the Navy’s surface fleet in coming years might need to avoid operating in waters that are within range of these weapons, or that the Navy might need to move toward a different fleet architecture that relies less on larger surface ships and more on smaller surface ships and submarines. Such changes in Navy operating areas and fleet architecture could substantially affect U.S. military strategy and the composition of the Navy’s shipbuilding expenditures.

Navy surface fleet leaders in early 2015 announced a new organizing concept for the Navy’s surface fleet called distributed lethality. Under distributed lethality, offensive weapons such as ASCMs are to be distributed more widely across all types of Navy surface ships, and new operational concepts for Navy surface ship formations are to be implemented. The aim of distributed lethality is to boost the surface fleet’s capability for attacking enemy ships and make it less possible for an enemy to cripple the U.S. fleet by concentrating its attacks on a few very-high-value Navy surface ships (particularly the Navy’s aircraft carriers). Perspectives on whether it would be cost effective to spend money spreading offensive weapons across a wider array of Navy surface ships might be influenced by views on whether those surface ships can adequately defend themselves against enemy missiles.

Two key limitations that Navy surface ships currently have in defending themselves against ASCMs and ASBMs are limited depth of magazine and unfavorable cost exchange ratios. Limited depth of magazine refers to the fact that Navy surface ships can use surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and their Close-in Weapon System (CIWS) Gatling guns to shoot down only a certain number of enemy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and anti-ship missiles before running out of SAMs and CIWS ammunition—a situation (sometimes called “going Winchester”), that can require a ship to withdraw from battle, spend time travelling to a safe reloading location (which can be hundreds of miles away), and then spend more time traveling back to the battle area.

Unfavorable cost exchange ratios refer to the fact that a SAM used to shoot down a UAV or anti-ship missile can cost the Navy more (perhaps much more) to procure than it cost the adversary to build or acquire the UAV or anti-ship missile. In the FY2016 defense budget, procurement costs for Navy SAMs ranged from about $900,000 per missile to several million dollars per missile, depending on the type.

In combat scenarios against an adversary with a limited number of UAVs and anti-ship missiles, an unfavorable cost exchange ratio can be acceptable because it saves the lives of Navy sailors and prevents very expensive damage to Navy ships. But in combat scenarios (or an ongoing military capabilities competition) against a country such as China that has many UAVs and anti-ship missiles and a capacity for building or acquiring many more, an unfavorable cost exchange ratio can become a very expensive—and potentially unaffordable—approach to defending Navy surface ships against UAVs and anti-ship missiles, particularly in a context of constraints on U.S. defense spending and competing demands for finite U.S. defense funds.

SSLs, EMRG, and HVP offer a potential for dramatically improving depth of magazine and the cost exchange ratio:

  • Depth of magazine. SSLs are electrically powered, drawing their power from the ship’s overall electrical supply, and can be fired over and over, indefinitely, as long as the SSL continues to work and the ship has fuel to generate electricity. The EMRG’s projectile and the HVP (which are one and the same) can be stored by the hundreds in a Navy surface ship’s weapon magazine.

  • Cost exchange ratio. An SSL can be fired for a marginal cost of less than one dollar per shot (which is the cost of the fuel needed to generate the electricity used in the shot), while the EMRG’s projectile/HVP has an estimated unit procurement cost of about $25,000.

This work was performed by Ronald O’Rourke for the Congressional Research Service. For more information, download the Technical Support Package (free white paper) at mobilityengineeringtech.com/tsp under the Optics, Photonics & Lasers category. CRS-0001



This Brief includes a Technical Support Package (TSP).
Document cover
Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Hypervelocity Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress

(reference CRS-0001) is currently available for download from the TSP library.

Don't have an account?



Magazine cover
Aerospace & Defense Technology Magazine

This article first appeared in the September, 2022 issue of Aerospace & Defense Technology Magazine.

Read more articles from this issue here.

Read more articles from the archives here.


Overview

The document provides a comprehensive overview of the development and strategic implementation of directed energy weapon systems within the U.S. Navy, particularly focusing on technologies such as solid-state lasers, the electromagnetic railgun, and hypervelocity projectiles. It highlights the increasing budget allocations for these programs, which have seen exponential growth, raising concerns about the potential risks associated with rapid expansion, including the strain on personnel and the impact on existing defense programs.

Key legislative frameworks, such as the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, are discussed, particularly regarding the rapid acquisition authority that allows the Secretary of Defense to expedite the procurement of urgently needed directed energy capabilities. The document outlines various acquisition authorities available to the Department of Defense, including simplified acquisition procedures and experimental procurement, aimed at enhancing the speed and efficiency of developing these advanced weapon systems.

The report emphasizes the need for a strategic plan to transition directed energy capabilities from development to fielding, addressing high-priority warfighting capability gaps. It calls for the engagement of defense industries, research universities, and nonprofit research institutions to foster collaboration and innovation in this field.

Concerns are raised about the adequacy of oversight and reporting on the transition of technologies from the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) to operational programs, highlighting the importance of transparency and accountability in the use of taxpayer resources. The document stresses the necessity of timely reports to Congress to ensure informed decision-making regarding funding and support for these advanced technologies.

Overall, the document serves as a critical resource for understanding the current state and future direction of directed energy weapon systems in the Navy, outlining both the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead in enhancing the U.S. military's capabilities in this rapidly evolving domain. It underscores the importance of strategic planning, effective resource management, and collaboration across various sectors to successfully integrate these advanced technologies into the Navy's operational framework.